Home » What Are the Reasons Behind Gulf Countries’ Refusal to Engage in U.S. and U.K. Military Operations Against the Houthis?

What Are the Reasons Behind Gulf Countries’ Refusal to Engage in U.S. and U.K. Military Operations Against the Houthis?

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Shibhaljazeera Net | International News

The Arab Center for Research in Washington stated that the Gulf states’ stance on not engaging in U.S. and British operations against the forces of the Sana’a government is driven by several factors, primarily the fear of being targeted by Yemeni attacks, as well as the widespread public support for the operations of Sana’a forces, which are seen as supportive of Gaza within the Arab world, including the Gulf states themselves.

The center published a report explaining that “since November of last year, the Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah, has been targeting commercial ships it claims are headed to Israeli ports or are linked to Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom, as a response to the war in Gaza.”

The report noted that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) are deeply concerned about the impact of Ansar Allah’s actions on shipping lanes, which are vital for oil and gas shipments that Gulf economies rely on.

Despite these concerns, the report suggests that “Gulf states view the U.S.-U.K. military intervention since January, aimed at deterring Houthi maritime attacks, as misleading. Although these states oppose Houthi attacks, most GCC leaders believe the U.S.-U.K. airstrikes against Ansar Allah are an unrealistic and dangerous strategy.”

The report emphasized that “the Gulf states have lost confidence in the U.S.’s ability to provide balanced leadership in the Middle East. Many officials in the Gulf view the U.S.-U.K. intervention against Ansar Allah as a destructive campaign. Gulf governments are increasingly aware that Washington is ignoring the security concerns of GCC countries regarding the Houthis and Iran, while providing unconditional support to Israel.”

The report added that “in January, some Gulf states expressed their concerns about Washington and London’s actions after the announcement of Operation Prosperity Guard. Qatar warned the West against focusing solely on the symptoms, while ignoring the root cause, which is Israel’s war on Gaza. Kuwait also expressed deep concern about developments in the Red Sea area following the attacks on sites in Yemen. Meanwhile, Oman went further, condemning the use of military action by friendly countries, criticizing the recourse to military force while Israel continues its brutal war without accountability.”

The report concluded that “it is not surprising that Muscat, Doha, and Kuwait have reacted negatively to the U.S.-U.K. military intervention against the Houthis. Oman has never participated in the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis that began in 2015, while Qatar separated from the coalition two years later. Kuwait’s role has largely been symbolic. However, Saudi Arabia’s decision to distance itself from U.S.-U.K. intervention might be the most surprising.”

The report pointed out that “Saudi Arabia, previously the most hardline GCC country against the Houthis, has strongly supported Western military action against them. But today, Saudi Arabia is trying to avoid war with Ansar Allah at almost any cost. In contrast, the UAE has not directly supported U.S.-U.K. measures but has also not condemned them. On January 12, Abu Dhabi emphasized the importance of maintaining security in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, taking a relatively neutral stance.”

The report further noted that “Arab officials in the Gulf have generally avoided publicly criticizing Washington and London on this issue. Given the close relationships between GCC members and the Western capitals, these officials may have chosen to express their concerns privately to avoid major disagreements.”

The report stressed that “this development must be understood in the context of multiple factors driving the GCC states to distance themselves from the U.S.-U.K. intervention in Yemen.” One of the main factors in these Gulf calculations is the increasing threat of retaliatory attacks by the Houthis. “During the Saudi-led military coalition’s war against the Houthis from March 2015 until the April 2022 ceasefire, Ansar Allah launched numerous missile and drone attacks against Saudi targets, such as Riyadh and Abha airports since 2017, a strike on an oil facility in Jazan in July 2020, and a series of attacks in March 2022 on natural gas stations, water desalination plants, and power stations.”

The report further noted that “Riyadh eventually decided to negotiate with Ansar Allah over the terms of its exit from the Yemeni quagmire, partly due to the impact of these repeated attacks on the Kingdom.”

It added, “Saudi Arabia realized that the threat posed by Ansar Allah would increase over time.” The report pointed out that “the Houthis have become more advanced in their missile and drone attacks. In the first nine months of 2021, the number of Houthi attacks against the Kingdom doubled compared to the same period in 2020.”

The report continued, “The Saudi government, focused on Vision 2030 and in need of massive foreign investment, recognized that its war against the Houthis, which seemed unprofitable, undermines its ability to achieve economic development and diversification goals. For example, in March 2022, Ansar Allah hit a fuel depot in Jeddah with a missile during the Formula 1 Grand Prix, reminding Riyadh that the sports and entertainment industries aligned with Vision 2030 require stability and security within the Kingdom.”

Similarly, the report explained that “the UAE suffered from Houthi attacks using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. On January 17, 2022, Ansar Allah targeted sites in Abu Dhabi, approximately 900 miles from Sana’a, killing three employees of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company. The missiles and drones also struck an oil facility and part of the Abu Dhabi International Airport under construction.”

The report noted that “UAE officials recognize the importance of maintaining the country’s reputation for internal stability, which is crucial for attracting companies, investments, and tourists. With nearly 90% of the country’s population being foreign, any threats (real or perceived) to their safety could have severe consequences on the UAE’s economy. Therefore, addressing such security concerns is a top priority for UAE authorities.”

The report added, “This year, Saudi and UAE officials observed the success of Houthi strikes in southern Israel and Tel Aviv using a version of the Samad-3 drone. This drone required approximately 1,600 miles to reach its target, indicating that Israeli, U.S., British, and Egyptian air defense systems failed to detect the drone. As Ansar Allah gains prominence within the Iran-led resistance axis due to their actions toward Israel, Tel Aviv faces serious security challenges posed by the Yemeni group. It’s easy to understand why Riyadh and Abu Dhabi officials are concerned about Ansar Allah’s capabilities.”

Based on the report, “Public opinion in the Arab world also motivates most Gulf countries to distance themselves from the U.S. and U.K. military operations against the Houthis. Even if all GCC governments oppose the Houthi maritime attacks, there is significant sympathy among their citizens for the Houthi operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. In the Arabian Gulf, a large part of the population sees Houthi actions as defense of Gaza. Therefore, if GCC countries were to support Operation Prosperity Guard or the U.S.-U.K. military intervention in Yemen, it could worsen tensions between the state and society. Given that the Palestinian issue can quickly mobilize Arab citizens, Gulf leaders are cautious about the impact of their reactions to the Gaza war on their legitimacy with their peoples, especially after growing rejection of Israeli normalization post-October 7.”

The report also noted that “for example, many Bahrainis on the X platform expressed their rejection of Manama’s role in Operation Prosperity Guard through the hashtag ‘Bahrainis Against the Alliance.’ Similarly, pro-Houthi messages from Oman’s Grand Mufti, who doesn’t represent the government but holds popular views among many Omanis, highlight the level of support for the Houthis among GCC citizens.”

In conclusion, the report stated that “most GCC countries and some other Arab governments express serious concerns about how U.S. and U.K. military action in Yemen might affect their security. As the first anniversary of Israel’s war on Gaza approaches, and the likelihood of a wider regional conflict in the Middle East increases, Gulf states will continue to strive to maintain their neutrality as much as possible regarding Western efforts to confront the Houthis in the Gulf of Aden and the southern Red Sea.”

Source: Yemen New News

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